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East Seats West: China's Accession to the World
Trade Organization and the Rise of a Potent Threat
to the North Carolina Furniture Industry
I. Introduction
After a start in rural sawmills, the furniture industry in North
Carolina grew to become a world-renowned center for furniture
production.1 By the end of the twentieth century, however, over
75,000 North Carolinians earned their wages on the floors of
furniture factories and produced $25 billion worth of merchandise
in one year.2 At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the rapid rise
of inexpensive, high-quality furniture imports now threatens to
undermine that tremendous success.'
The nation posing the biggest threat is China.' China's drive
to accede to the World Trade Organization (WTO) has led to
unprecedented economic growth in the once-closed country and
has created a low-cost, high-quality industrial giant that poses a
serious threat to the North Carolina furniture industry. Beginning
in the late 1970s, China embarked on a roller coaster ride of
economic reforms. 5  After a half-century of operating a closed,
controlled economy, the Chinese embraced free market ideals.6
The reform, however, was incomplete and vestiges of the old
I See Charles H. V. Ebert, Furniture Making in High Point, 36 N.C. HIST. REv.
330, 331 (1959); DREXEL ENTER., INC., SIXTY YEARS OF PROGRESS IN THE MAKING OF
FINE FURNITURE, 1903-1963, 20-21; N.C. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE FURNITURE AND
FIXTURES INDUSTRY IN NORTH CAROLINA (2000), available at
http://cmedis.commerce.state.nc.us/econdata/industryprofiles/fumiture.pdf [hereinafter
DREXEL ENTERPRISES] (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
2 Manufacturers Get Hit Hard on the Home Front, Bus.: N. C., Feb. 2002, at 38.
3 Id.
4 See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, INDUSTRY & TRADE SUMMARY: FURNITURE AND
MOTOR VEHICLE SEATS, Jan. 2001, at 28 [hereinafter MOTOR VEHICLE SEATS].
5 See generally CHINA'S ECONOMIC REFORM (Walter Galensen ed., 1993) (tracing
the emergence of the Chinese economy from closed, controlled, and isolated to open,
free, and global).
6 Id. at 12-17.
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economy remained.7  The Chinese government's continued
influence on the economy made U.S. investors wary of the new
market, leading major U.S. furniture manufacturers to ignore the
cost-saving opportunities in China.8
A desire to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and, subsequently, the WTO fueled China's drive toward
a market economy.9 To the Chinese, accession to GATT and the
WTO would solidify its place as a major participant in the
international trade market by providing a mechanism for receiving
equal treatment in the world market and reducing tariff barriers to
the United States's market.' ° The benefits to the United States and
other free market economies is that Chinese accession to the WTO
would place the Chinese economy under the guiding principles of
these agreements and shake off the market obstructions remaining
from the government-controlled economy.11 The core principles
of these multilateral trade agreements are the promotion of
transparency in trade laws, the nationalization of trade laws, the
reduction of protectionist tariffs, and the equal treatment of
domestic and international companies that operate in the country. 2
As China proceeded on its fifteen-year attempt at accession, these
principles gradually pushed China away from its past economic
practices and toward a stable, attractive, market-based economy. 3
7 Id. at 24.
8 See id.; Interview with Alan Cole, Former Chief Executive Officer, Lifestyle
Furnishings (Apr. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Cole Interview]. Alan Cole entered the
furniture industry immediately after graduating from college in 1972. During his 30
years in the industry he has worked in both sales and management. Most recently, he
served as Chief Executive Officer of Lifestyle Furnishings, one of the world's largest
producers of home furnishings. Id.
9 See generally HAROLD K. JACOBSON & MICHEL OKSENBERG, CHINA'S
PARTICIPATION IN THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK, AND GATT: TOWARD A GLOBAL
ECONOMIC ORDER viii (Univ. of Mich. Press 1990) (discussing the history of and China's
motives for changing from a controlled command economy to an open-market economy
at the end of the twentieth century).
10 See Ya Qin, China and GATT: Toward a Meaningful Participation? 7 (1990)
(unpublished S.J.D. thesis, Harvard Law School) [hereinafter Ya Qin] (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
II See Susan Hamrock et al., China's Entry Into the WTO: What it Means for U.S.
Industry, EXPORT AM., Jan. 2002, at 22-23.
12 See id. at 23-25.
13 See id.
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Both the skepticism and doubt that characterized the attitude of
North Carolina furniture manufactures during China's first years
of reform faded as the Chinese became a competitive force in the
marketplace. 4 The series of reforms required by the WTO for
China to accede gradually altered the Chinese industry and led
North Carolina manufacturers to view China differently. By the
start of the twenty-first century, industry executives viewed China
as a key competitor that could no longer be ignored.'
This change in economics and attitude resulted in the rapid rise
in furniture imports from China and the scramble of U.S.
manufacturers to benefit from the low-wage, high-quality
craftsmanship available in China.16 By 1999, the United States
imported over $3 billion of furniture from China, an increase of
309% since 1995.'" Now, "the question for many U.S.
manufacturers has become not 'Should we import?' but 'How
much?""'5 8  Furthermore, U.S. manufacturers are moving
operations to China and shuttering factories at home.' 9 It is now
clearly established that China is a major player in the home
furnishings industry. Whether North Carolina manufacturers will
survive the challenge China's success poses remains to be seen.
Part II of this article will provide background information on
the origins and development of the North Carolina Furniture
industry. Part III focuses on the economic transformation that
began in China during the 1960's and highlights its successes and
failures with regard to entering the world market. Part IV
examines the North Carolina furniture industry's treatment of
China following the early reforms. Parts V and VI continue the
story of China's economic transformation by detailing China's long
path to accession to the WTO. Part VII reviews the impact that
Chinese accession to the WTO has had on both the Chinese and
American manufacturing sectors. Finally, Part VIII looks
14 Cole Interview, supra note 8.
15 Id.
16 See MOTOR VEHICLE SEATS, supra note 4, at 44-46.
17 Id. at 28.
18 Hannah Miller, Furniture Imports: Opportunity or Threat?, WOOD & WOOD
PRODUCTS, Jul. 1, 2001, at 95.
19 See Bennett Voyles, Ethan Allen Goes Global, WOOD & WOOD PRODUCTS, Jan.
2002, at 47.
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specifically at the impact that the Chinese economic
transformation has had on the North Carolina furniture industry.
II. A Brief History of the North Carolina Furniture Industry
As previously discussed, during the twentieth century, North
Carolina became one of the world's leading home furnishing
manufacturing centers. 21 Out of small-scale production facilities
engineered to provide lumber and furniture to local settlers,
industrious North Carolinians developed an industry that supplied
home furnishings to consumers across the nation and around the
world.21
The North Carolina furniture industry flourished in the
piedmont and foothills regions due to a confluence of
advantageous natural and human resources.22  Two natural
resources are essential to furniture production: a source of power
23to run the furniture plants and lumber to craft into furniture.
North Carolina had an abundance of both.2 4 The geography of the
piedmont and foothills regions, which combined numerous rivers
with vast hardwood forests, provided a plentiful supply of both
water power and virgin timber.25 Additionally, the early North
Carolina furniture industry benefited from a local labor market
that provided plentiful, inexpensive hands for the labor intensive
and highly skilled industry.26 The fact that skilled woodworkers
settled in the area and that there was little competition from other
industries ensured that the expanding furniture industry would
have an ample labor supply to man the lines of new furniture
factories.27
This combination allowed the North Carolina furniture
industry to progress from its foundation of rural lumber mills to
20 See Ebert, supra note 1, at 331; DREXEL ENTERPRISES, supra note 1, at 20-21;
N.C. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 1.
21 See generally DREXEL ENTERPRISES, supra note 1 (chronicling the rise of a major
North Carolina furniture manufacturer).
22 Ebert, supra note 1, at 331.
23 See id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 331-32.
26 DREXEL ENTERPRISES, supra note 1, at 20-21.
27 See Ebert, supra note 1, at 333-34.
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one of the world's leading suppliers of home furnishings. 28 The
local needs of North Carolina settlers provided the initial demand
for the budding North Carolina furniture manufacturers. 29  An
example of this early development is Drexel, North Carolina,
where a sawmill opened at the turn of the twentieth century to
provide cut boards for the local population's corn cribs.3" The
skill of traveling cabinetmakers who passed through and
eventually settled in the state complemented the production of
sawmills like the one in Drexel and provided a foundation for the
mass-production of furniture." As demand for home furnishings
grew during the early years of the twentieth century, capital
investment in furniture manufacturing increased and emerging
furniture plants raised production levels and increased
distribution.32 By 1920, North Carolina furniture manufacturers
dominated the market in the South and stood poised to take a
significant share of the national market due to the factors
discussed above, along with a climate that was less severe than its
competitors in the North.33
In 1921, the Southern Furniture Expo Building opened in High
Point, N.C., fueling the expansion of the North Carolina furniture
industry into markets outside the South.3 4 By 1923, thirty-four
manufacturers participated in the bi-annual market which drew
buyers from across the nation.35 The decade following the opening
of the furniture market witnessed an increase in production of
furniture from $30 million to $56 million and North Carolina
became the sixth leading producer of furniture in the United
States.36 After its strong entry into the national home furnishing
market, North Carolina manufacturers began attracting high-grade
furniture production from manufacturing centers in the North
through the enticements of a union-free, highly skilled labor force
28 See generally id. (detailing the rise of the North Carolina furniture industry).
29 See id. at 333.
30 See id. at 330.
31 See id. at 333.
32 Id. at 334.
33 See id.
34 See id.
35 Id. at 336.
36 Id.
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and a steady supply of hardwood.37 North Carolina State
University and Catawba Valley Technical Institute furthered the
development of the furniture industry through the creation of a
curriculum focused on the study of wood and wood products.38
Ultimately, the high-quality, high-volume furniture production
center located in a 150-mile area surrounding High Point came to
be known as the greatest area in the United States for the
manufacture of wooden furniture.39
The 1990s brought tremendous growth to both the U.S. and
North Carolina furniture industries. One-time sawmill towns
housed multi-million dollar furniture production and distribution
facilities as an essential element of a domestic industry that grew
from $16 billion in sales in 1990 to $25 billion in sales in 2000.40
In 1998, North Carolina furniture manufacturers employed over
75,000 workers, nearly 15% of the nation's 500,000 furniture-
industry employees. 4' Drexel Heritage, a company that evolved
from the previously noted corn-crib manufacturer in Drexel, N.C.
and whose customer base was once limited to local settlers, made
plans to expand from 70 to 150 retail stores nationwide.42
Likewise, in High Point, the Southern Furniture Market that once
boasted of having 100 exhibitors and 400 attendees has now
become the International Home Furnishings Market with 3,000
exhibitors and 83,000 attendees from over 110 nations.43 The
tremendous growth experienced by domestic furniture
manufacturers led to tremendous sales and optimistic growth
projections when the furniture industry experienced one of its
37 Interview with Ralph Bowman, Southern Oral History Program (on file with
author).
38 See id.
39 Ebert, supra note 1, at 338.
40 See Bonnie Eksten, Fine Furniture Industry Losing Billions: Imports, Soft
Economy Hit Home in High Point, WILMINGTON STAR-NEWS, Oct. 28, 2001 at 1E
[hereinafter Eksten].
41 N.C. DEP'TOF COMMERCE, supra note 1, at 3.
42 Robert Marks, Drexel Heritage: 4 Dedicated Stores, HOME FURNISHINGS DAILY,
May 3, 1993, at 25.
43 High Point International Home Furnishings Market Authority, Market Facts, at
http://www.highpointmarket.org/marketfacts.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2003) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
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most productive years in 1998."4
As the 1990s drew to a close, however, a tremendous rise in
home furnishing imports coupled with a slowing economy began
to undercut the growth witnessed during the late 1990s. Between
1990 and 2000, imports of home furnishings rose over 350% from
$3.4 billion to $12.2 billion.45  As a ratio to domestic sales, this
rise in imports represents an increase from 21% of domestic sales
in 1990 to 50% in 2000.46 With the rising competition from
overseas, North Carolina furniture manufacturer worries shifted
from how to meet demand to how to survive in a global
manufacturing market. 47 Among those presenting competition to
domestic furniture manufacturing, none drew more attention than
the world's fastest rising manufacturer of home furnishings - the
People's Republic of China.48
III. The Early Years of China's World Trade Evolution
At the same time that the North Carolina furniture industry
developed into a dominant force in the world's home furnishings
market, China experienced a series of drastic political and
economic reforms.49 After starting the twentieth century as a
significant international trade partner, the world's most populous
nation entered a period of intense economic isolation only to re-
emerge at the close of the century with a period of unmatched
economic growth, leading it to become the "workshop of the
world."5
Prior to the 1949 Communist Revolution and the
44 Mary Ellen Lloyd, Furniture Makers Struggling to Meet Demand, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 29, 1998, at T1.
45 Eksten, supra note 40.
46 See id.
47 Compare Lloyd, supra note 44, at T1 (noting that a strong market for home
furnishings forced manufacturers to struggle to meet demand), with Jon E. Hilsenrath &
Peter Wonacott, The Economy: Imports Hammer Furniture Makers, WALL ST. J., Sep.
20, 2002 at A2 (highlighting the impact that increased furniture imports are having on
domestic furniture manufacturers).
48 See MOTOR VEHICLE SEATS, supra note 4, at 28-29.
49 See generally CHINA'S ECONOMIC REFORM, supra note 5 (tracing the emergence
of the Chinese economy from closed, controlled, and isolated to open, free, and global).
50 Johnathan Anderson, China, Asia's Paper Tiger?, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 15,
2002, at A7.
20031
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
implementation of tight restrictions on trade with other nations,
Chinese industry played a significant role in international trade."
In 1928, private Chinese enterprises produced 2.3% of all goods
traded in the international market.5 2 The United States served as
China's leading trade partner, accounting for 20% of China's
imports and 22% of its exports in 1936. 53 Following World War II,
when major trade nations joined together to compose the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), China signified its
commitment to participate in international trade by entering GATT
as a charter member. 4 Following the Revolution, however, the
Chinese government withdrew from GATT, signaling a stark shift
in attitude toward China's participation in world trade.55
With the success of the Mao revolutionaries in 1949, the ruling
communist government implemented a command economy that
controlled every facet of the nation's economy - including
international trade - for almost twenty years. 6  Under the
command economy, the government created an integrated system
in which the state owned all production facilities and central
planners determined how to allocate resources, "the volume and
composition of output," the method of production, and the
distribution of the final product. 7  The Chinese government
viewed international trade as an instrument of its policy and
controlled foreign trade through government-run corporations that
ensured that all Chinese trade complied with the overarching state
plan." The result of this trade plan was that only a small number
of authorized state trading companies could engage in
international trade, thus allowing the state to control the price,
51 See China and the WTO: The Real Leap Forward, ECONOMIST, Nov. 20-26,
1999, at 25 [hereinafter The Real Leap Forward].
52 See id.
53 Chu-Yuan Cheng, The Future Prospects of U.S.-China Economic Relations,
U.S.A. TODAY MAG., Sep. 1, 2002, at 16.
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 Kung-Chia Yeh, Economic Reform: An Overview, in CHINA'S ECONOMIC
REFORM 11, 15 (Walter Galensen ed., 1993).
57 Id. at 12-13.
58 See Hang-Seng Cheng, Foreign Trade, in CHINA'S ECONOMIC REFORM 197, 197
(Walter Galensen ed., 1993).
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quantity, and composition of both imports and exports.59 The
plans provided detailed control of trade and dictated production
down to the amount of a commodity to trade, where the
commodity would be traded, and which enterprise would engage
in the exchange.60 The result of this control was a stable, but low
level of trade.61
Three distinct periods of trade followed the implementation of
strict state controls.62 In the 1950s, China focused on importing
heavy equipment from the Soviet Union in order to build the basic
economic infrastructure out of its "war-ravaged economy., 63 The
1960s brought a reduced emphasis on foreign trade, and trade
volume remained stagnant in spite of economic growth. 4 In the
1970s, the government recognized a need to import foreign
industrial technology from the West and trade returned to the
1950s levels.65 In spite of modest trade growth in the 1970s,
China accounted for only 0.6% of world trade in 1977, and the
once strong trade relationship with the United States accounted for
only 1.6% of China's total trade in 1972.66
The low level of Chinese participation in world trade in the
late 1970s was just one of many symptoms of a failing economic
system.67 In 1978, Chinese government officials gathered at the
third Plenum of the eleventh Central Committee amid economic
turmoil: the Chinese economy "was plagued by slow growth of
agriculture, persistent bottlenecks in energy, massive
unemployment and an acute shortage of technical manpower, a
large but technologically backward capital stock, institutional
59 See Walter Galenson, Introduction, in CHINA'S ECONOMIC REFORM 1, 7 (Walter
Galenson ed., 1993).
60 Cheng, supra note 58, at 203-04.
61 Id. at 201 (demonstrating through graphs a steady, low level of trade between
1950 and the late 1970s).
62 Id. at 199-200.
63 Id. at 200.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 The Real Leap Forward, supra note 51 (demonstrating the effect of the
communist regime on China's place in the world trade market). Chu Yuan-Cheng, supra
note 53, at 16 (highlighting the impact of China's closed policy on its trade relationship
with the United States).
67 The Real Leap Forward, supra note 51.
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rigidities, and economic insufficiencies."68 The tight government
control of the economy had failed.69 Low-quality physical capital
and ill-trained human capital resulted from an emphasis on the
accumulation of capital and a disdain for formal education.7"
"Retarded technological progress" resulted from a failure to
properly train or efficiently use the nation's manpower.7' Irrational
government price controls led to an inefficient allocation of
resources that was based primarily on the interests of politicians
and the military.72 Among the barriers to efficient allocation of
resources was the failure to engage in world trade, which resulted
in an inability to benefit from "international specialization of the
economy" and the "inflow of capital from abroad."73 Because of
these economic failures, China in the late 1970s "remained a low-
income economy by World Bank Standards," as it had a "per
capita GNP that was the lowest among the centrally planned
economies" and had a standard of living that had not improved
since the 1950s. 74  Little choice remained for the Chinese
government but to implement a series of economic reforms.75
Rather than replace its command economy with a market-
based economy, Chinese reformers met somewhere in the middle
and implemented a hybrid economic system that combined
government control with market principles in an attempt to steer
free market benefits toward planned government goals.76 These
reforms led to a number of significant changes in the Chinese
economic structure.77  Shared power between enterprises,
households, and individuals replaced the strict government dictates
of the past.78  Market forces supplemented state direction on
68 Yeh, supra note 56, at 15.
69 See generally id.
70 Id. at 13.
71 Id. at 13-14.
72 Id. at 14.
73 Id. at 14-15.
74 Id. at 13.
75 See id. at 16.
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 ld.
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production. 9  Limited private ownership emerged."0  The
government made a crucial decision to actively participate in the
world economy.8' The result of these economic reforms was that
by the 1990s, the centralized planning system had been partially
dismantled, elements of a market system emerged, and the
economy had begun its transformation from being closed to
becoming open.8
2
As with the general economic reform, a stagnant economy,
poor production, and a rigidly low standard of living provided the
impetus for Chinese trade reform.83 All Chinese trade activity prior
to 1978 centered on a national foreign trade plan formulated by the
central government and executed by a small number of foreign
trade companies.8" The central government allowed importing
only when domestic production of a needed good or service was
unavailable.85 In turn, the goal of export planning was to identify
world demand for a domestic product and export an amount of that
product sufficient to cover the government's costs for approved
imports. 8' The lack of profit motive - all profits from export sales
were turned over to the government - and the export monopoly
held by the foreign trade companies destroyed any incentive for
Chinese corporations to produce for the export market.87
In December of 1978, the Chinese government decided to
reform its trade sector and thrust the nation's economy back onto
the world market.88 In contrast to the Maoist leaders, Chinese
leaders in the 1980s saw joining the world economy as essential to
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 24.
83 Cheng, supra note 58, at 208.
84 Id. at 205. In 1978, prior to reform, there were fourteen state trading companies
that focused on specific sectors of the economy such as "technology; machinery;
minerals and metals; chemicals; instruments; cereals, oil, and foodstuffs; textiles, light
industrial products; arts and crafts; native products and animal by-products; medicines
and health-care products; and packaging." Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 206-07.
88 Id. at 208.
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long term economic success.89 The first step in the trade reform
process was to break up the trade monopolies held by the foreign
trade corporations.9" The government sought to achieve this goal
by giving the provincial governments the power to control trade
through their own trade enterprises and to control branches of the
state trading corporations located in the provinces.91 Additionally,
large enterprises were given the authority to trade independently
of state-controlled trade corporations.92 A second major step in the
trade reform process was the reduction in the number of planned
exports. 93 Third, the Chinese implemented a series of reforms to
foster a foreign exchange retention system that would allow
foreign trade companies to retain a portion of proceeds obtained
through foreign exchange, thereby providing a profit motive to
produce goods for export.94 Fourth, the Chinese introduced price
reforms that would lead prices to more accurately reflect the
domestic and world markets. 95  Intense competition between
foreign trade corporations was a by-product of the price reforms
and domestic prices quickly inflated above those of the world
market.96
To counterbalance inflation and a rapid rise in imports, China
launched an export promotion program that resulted in huge
export subsidies that burdened the government. 97 This burden led
the government to implement a program that gave foreign trade
companies the responsibility for the trade market.98 The central
89 See Peter Nolan, Introduction: The Chinese Puzzle, in CHINA'S ECONOMIC
REFORMS: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF INCREMENTALISM (Qimiao Fan & Peter Nolan
eds., 1994).
90 Cheng, supra note 58, at 209.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 210.
94 See id. at 212. Initially, the exchange retention system used a complex formula
to calculate the percentage of export proceeds that the export producers were allowed to
keep. The earnings were not transferable. Id. A series of reforms throughout the 1980s,
however, eliminated these hindrances on the foreign exchange market and led China
toward a private foreign exchange market by the early 1990s. Id. at 213.
95 See id. at 216.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
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government shifted the burden of managing the trade market to
foreign trade companies by granting them limited autonomy
through contracts that set targets for "foreign exchange earnings,
total cost of operation, and net profit or loss."99
After the series of reform measures loosened the strangle hold
that central planners had on the Chinese trade market, a rapid
increase in trade revenue followed throughout the 1980s. °° The
results of these reforms were that 5,000 foreign trade companies
existed in 1991 where only fourteen existed in 1978, and the
number of planned exports decreased from 3,000 in 1979 to only
112 by 1988.10 The 1991 trade measures, when compared to 1978
figures, indicate an astounding rise for the Chinese trade economy:
exports rose from $10 billion to $61.2 billion, imports rose from
$11.1 billion to $52.5 billion, and foreign investment totaled
34,000 investments, amounting to $24 billion.10 2
In spite of the many trade reforms implemented by China
between 1978 and 1991 and the tremendous growth that resulted,
many trade restrictions remained in place that kept China from
"reaping the full benefits of international trade and investment."10 3
Because the central government viewed trade as vital to the
national economy, it was now less reluctant to eliminate
government control. 104  This reluctance limited the reform
measures started in 1978, and the many trade barriers of the 1990s
remained in place. Trade restrictions like import tariffs, export
taxes, and import and export licenses took the place of trade
planning, and the government continued to apply a heavy hand in
export production through "guidance planning. ' 'f °0
IV. The Furniture Industry Ignores China
Generally, home furnishings imports from China did not pose
a significant threat to the U.S. home furnishings industry through
99 Id.
100 Id. at 200-01.
10 Id. at 209-10.
102 Id. at 199.
103 Id. at 219.
IN Id. at 198.
105 Id. at 220-21.
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the 1980s and into the early 1990s.' 1 6 In spite of the early
economic reforms in China, the United States did not experience a
significant rise in home furnishings imports from the world's most
populous nation until the mid-1990s. In 1995, Chinese imports
amounted to $739 million, only nine percent of the United States's
total furniture imports.107
Prior to the 1990s a number of factors dissuaded U.S. furniture
manufacturers from operating production plants in mainland
China.0 8 Although furniture manufacturers looked toward Pacific
Rim countries for the possibility of operating furniture factories at
lower costs, they did so with a skeptical eye.0 9 This skepticism
extended to conducting trade with China."0  Domestic
manufacturers hesitated to work with the Communist government
due to a perceived lack of stability in the government
administration and a feeling that the Chinese were ambivalent
about welcoming U.S. entrance into their market."' Additional
concerns included the human rights record of the Chinese
government and the treatment of Chinese laborers." 2 This popular
perception of communist countries during the Cold War also
played a role in chilling U.S. furniture manufacturers' attitude
toward operating in China."' The strong opposition to
communism exercised during the Cold War left lingering
suspicions in the minds of U.S. furniture executives and gave them
an emotional disincentive to operate in China."4 Furthermore, the
anti-communist attitude of the majority of U.S. consumers worried
executives that the American people would be reluctant to buy
goods manufactured in China and made it difficult to convince
employees that a move to China was necessary.' Operating
106 MOTOR VEHICLE SEATS, supra note 4.
107 Id.
108 See Cole Interview, supra note 8.
109 Id.
110 Id.
I' Id.
112 Id.
"13 Id.
'14 Id.
II5 Id. Mr. Cole notes that many furniture manufacturing centers are located in
small towns and that, due to the close-knit feeling of communities that support the
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overseas was not seen as a critical component of the furniture
industry and many executives shared the attitude that "we really
don't want to do business there."'"16
A few small furniture manufacturers recognized an economic
advantage to operating in China and tested the Chinese industrial
waters during the 1980s and early 1990s." 7 Major manufacturers,
however, were skeptical and saw the early risk-takers as
"pioneers.""' 8  These "pioneers" entered a volatile economic
climate that provided low-cost, high-quality production at the cost
of reliability." 9  In the 1980s, "frustration and delay [were] an
inevitable part of doing business in China."'2 ° Chinese tension
between the desire for economic growth and the fear of economic
liberalization cast doubt in the minds of American companies and
kept an air of uncertainty surrounding the slow migration to
China. 121
V. GATT's Influence on China's Trade Reform
One catalyst driving China's economic reform in the 1980s
was its desire to join GATT. After its initial application for entry
in 1986, officials from GATT repeatedly reviewed China's trade
system and found it incompatible with the free-trade principles of
GATT. 122  As a result, China's desire to become a member of
GATT could result only from continued reforms of China's trade
laws. 12
3
Drafted at the Havana Conference in 1947, GATT was formed
to promote trade liberalization and to remove trade barriers that
damaged the international economy prior to World War 11.124
furniture industry, executives are reluctant to close factories unless it is necessary to keep
the company viable. Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 See Barich Group Finds New Doors Opening in China, 8 SAN DIEGO Bus. J. 7,
(Jun. 13, 1998).
120 See id.
121 See id.
122 See Cheng, supra note 58, at 198.
123 Id.
124 JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 9, at 24.
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GATT joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank as one of the three key institutions formed to stabilize
the international economy. 125  GATT focused on "establishing a
legal framework for the conduct of international commerce.' 26
The idea for establishing GATT stemmed from documents
generated during World War II by the United States Department of
State that focused on the creation of a "multilateral trade regime."
This was seen as a method of stabilizing the post-war economy.127
Based on the premise that all nations benefit from unfettered trade,
U.S. government officials summarized the idea behind the creation
of GATT as follows:
[W]hat is needed is a broad and yet detailed agreement among
many nations, dealing at one time with many different aspects of
government restrictions upon trade, reducing all of them at once
on a balanced and equitable basis, and stating rules and
principles within which the restrictions permitted to remain
should be administered. 12
8
The twenty-three original GATT signatories'29 reflected this
sentiment in the preamble to the original 1947 agreement. 30 In the
preamble, the signatories recognized that international trade can
lead to widespread economic improvement and resolved to
promote a strong trade system by "entering into reciprocal and
mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international
125 See id. at 1-2.
126 Id. The International Monetary Fund monitors and stabilizes exchange rates
while the World Bank provides capital assistance to developing nations as a means of
promoting economic growth. Id.
127 J. Goldstein, Creating GATT Rules: Politics, Institutions, and American Policy,
in THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE WORLD ECONOMY 22,
34 (Robert Howse ed., 1998).
128 Id. at 34-35.
129 The twenty-three original signatories include Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma,
Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon,
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, South Africa, Southern
Rhodesia, Syria, the United Kingdom, and the United States. General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-ll, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT
1947].
130 See id.
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commerce."131
The driving principle behind the formation of GATT was the
desire to "reduce trade barriers as much as possibly agreeable
among its numerous members."'3 2 GATT developed as the
primary mechanism for forming and regulating international trade
agreements.13 1 Originally, interested countries formed GATT with
the expectation that the newly formed International Trade
Organization (ITO) would administer the agreement.' The failure
of the ITO, however, led GATT participants to treat GATT as an
international organization with the purpose of handling various
trade-related issues, thus elevating the influence that GATT had on
shaping international trade.'
The 1947 agreement included a number of provisions drafted
with the intent of facilitating international trade and developing
strong trade ties between participating members.'36 With the hope
of fostering free trade and promoting international commerce,
GATT signatories entered into a sweeping agreement that shaped
many aspects of the trade policy of contracting parties and
controlled the trade relations between these parties.
13 7
One of the primary tenets of GATT is the prevention of
discrimination between member nations.' The most prominent
anti-discrimination measure found in GATT is the requirement
that GATT members extend most favored nation status to every
131 Id.
132 PENELOPE FAY HEAVNER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR
CONGRESS, GATT: BACKGROUND INFORMATION, at 4 (Feb. 17, 1994).
133 Id.
134 Robert A. Weaver & Delphine A. Abellard, THE FUNCTIONING OF THE GATT
SYSTEM 7 (1993).
135 Id. The ITO was originally intended to complement the International Monetary
Fund and World Bank, both formed at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, as the third
leg of post-World War II international economic stabilizers. Id. at 2-5. While GATT
received strong support from the United States, some U.S. politicians developed strong
opposition to the formation of the ITO. Id. Ultimately, this opposition would preclude
Congressional approval of the ITO, and, without the support of the world's leading
economy, the ITO failed to materialize. Id.
136 See GATT 1947, supra note 129.
137 See id.
138 See HEAVNER, supra note 132, at 5.
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member state. 3 9 The most favored nation clause of Article I
requires, with exceptions, that contracting parties grant all other
contracting parties any "advantage, favour, privilege, or
immunity" given to the trade products of any of the contracting
parties. 4 ° The most favored nation requirement allows members
to enjoy tariffs at the lowest rate extended to other members and
the extension of non-tariff concessions to all members. 14' The end
result of this agreement is that members are guaranteed to receive
the same benefits as other members. 14 2
A second key provision of GATT that leads to open trade is
the requirement of transparency. 143  Article II integrates the
Schedule of Concessions agreed between the parties as "an
integral part of Part I of this Agreement.' ' 144 GATT requires that
one member nation provide treatment to a second member nation
on terms at least as favorable as those published in the Schedule of
Concessions as an annex to GATT. 145  Should a member nation
attempt to assess charges on imports that exceed the amounts
published in the Schedule, GATT provides an exemption for
products listed in the Schedule from customs duties and other
related charges. 146 GATT also places restrictions on the ability of
contracting parties to alter their method of valuing foreign
currencies in order to prevent one member from manipulating
these values and assessing higher duties. 141
A third key requirement of GATT is that it "requires that
members give imported goods equal treatment to that of domestic
goods."'148  Article III of GATT includes the requirement of
139 Id. The term "most favored nation" does not imply that a nation receive better
treatment than other nations. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1031 (7th ed. 1999).
Instead, status as most favored nation allows a country participating in a multilateral
trade agreement to enjoy the trade privileges of other treaty participants. Id.
140 GATT 1947, supra note 129, art. 1, para. 1.
141 HEAVNER, supra note 132, at 5.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 4-5.
144 GATT 1947, supra note 129, art. II.
145 See id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 HEAVNER, supra note 132, at 5.
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"National Treatment" and lists a number of provisions that inhibit
a member nation's ability to restrict trade through protectionism in
the form of taxes and regulations that would make the cost of
imported goods prohibitively expensive. 4 9 With regard to internal
taxes, the Agreement provides that "[t]he products of the territory
of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall not be subject, directly, or indirectly, to
internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of
those applied ... to like domestic products."' 5 ° Similarly, with
regard to internal regulation of products that affect sale and
distribution of the goods, the Agreement requires that imported
products receive "treatment no less favourable than that accorded"
domestically produced products.' 5' Internal taxes and charges
cannot be applied to imports in a manner that exceeds a similar
assessment on domestic products.' Article III disallows member
nations from setting quantitative restrictions "relating to the
mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or
proportions" that would require a certain amount of that product to
come from domestic sources.' 53
Other notable provisions of GATT prohibit member nations
from dumping goods, require the publication of trade regulations,
eliminate import and export quotas, and restrict the ability of states
to subsidize or otherwise interfere with market-based
production.'54 Article IV of GATT recognizes that the practice of
dumping55 has the potential to have an unfair, adverse impact on
established industries or may impair the development of
149 See GATT 1947, supra note 129, art. III.
150 Id.
151 Id. para. 2.
152 See generally id. art. III.
153 Id. para. 5. The Agreement exempts from the restrictions of Article III products
bought through government procurement. Id.
154 See id. This list of provisions is not comprehensive. See id. The original GATT
includes thirty-eight articles that cover all aspects of international trade. Id. These
provisions have been highlighted due to the impact they had on the reform of China's
trade policy.
155 Dumping occurs when one contracting party introduces products into the market
of a second contracting party at prices lower than the normal market cost of such
products in the exporting country. Id. art. VI, para. 1.
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competing industries of contracting parties.'56  To dissuade
contracting parties from participating in the practice of dumping
and to ameliorate the effects that dumping has on countries
affected by the practice, GATT allows these nations to impose
duties on products that are being dumped.157
Demonstrating the desire of GATT's drafters to foster
transparency in international trade, Article X of GATT requires
that "laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative
rulings of general application, made effective by any contracting
party" that impact trade must be "published promptly in such a
manner as to enable governments and traders to become
acquainted with them." '158 Article XI of GATT fosters free trade
by constraining the ability of contracting parties to impose
quantitative restrictions on the import and export of goods.'59
With exceptions, GATT provides that no "quotas, import or export
licenses or other measures" may be imposed on the imports or
exports of a contracting party. 160  GATT deals with state
participation in the production market via strict limitations on
subsidies and the involvement of "state trading enterprises.''
With regard to subsidies, Article XVI requires contracting parties
who are subsidizing production to notify all other contracting
parties of the subsidies, the estimated impact that these subsidies
will have on the quantity of imports and exports, and the reason
why the subsidy is necessary. 162 Should a contracting party have
reservations or objections about the subsidization, GATT calls for
the parties to enter into discussions to consider "limiting the
subsidy.'5163  Ultimately, as seen in Article XVI of GATT, the
purpose of the subsidy limitation is to prohibit a contracting party
from subsidizing an industry to the extent that the party develops
156 Id. art. VI.
157 Id. Countervailing duties may be assessed in an amount "not greater than the
margin of dumping in respect of such product" as determined by guidelines set out in
Article IV. See id.
158 Id. art. X, para. 1.
159 Id. art. XI.
160 Id. para. 1.
161 Id. art. XVII.
162 Id. art. XVI, para. 1.
163 Id.
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"more than an equitable share of world export trade in that
product."' 64  Similarly, GATT limits direct governmental
interference in trade by mandating that states forming "state
trading enterprises" must act in a non-discriminatory manner with
regard to the import and export of goods by private entities.'65
GATT developed into a dominant, controlling force in
international trade. 166 After starting with twenty-three participants
in 1947, 115 contracting parties representing ninety percent of the
world's trade market joined GATT by 1994, with other countries
waiting to join. 167  An organization that had an original staff
composed of nine staffers and six typists grew to a staff of 400.161
With the failure of the ITO, GATT took on the characteristics of
an international organization with the contracting parties
controlling many aspects of international trade.
69
Article XXV confers broad authority on the contracting
parties. They are given the exclusive authority to legislate, render
judgments on the conformity of trade policies of the contracting
parties, and waive member rights and obligations. All other
aspects of GATT exist and are empowered solely by delegations
of authority by the contracting parties. The contracting parties
also have the legal competence to establish relations with states,
international organizations, and private persons. GATT
additionally confers decision-making authority exclusively on the
contracting parties.17
0
In addition, GATT gave power to contracting parties beyond
administering the many provisions of GATT. 7' Though difficult,
GATT gives contracting parties the power to amend the
Agreement and to expand its scope. 172 When the meaning of a
provision in the Agreement is unclear, the contracting parties act
as a judicial body by interpreting these provisions and resolving
164 Id. art. XVI, para 3.
165 See id. art. XVII.
166 HEAVNER, supra note 132, at 5.
167 Id. at 5-6.
168 Id. at 6.
169 See Weaver & Abellard, supra note 134, at 7.
170 Id. at 7-8 (citations omitted).
171 See id.
172 Id. at 8.
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disputes between parties.'73 With the growing membership in
GATT, the all-encompassing power given to Contracting Parties,
and the dominant role that GATT played in international trade,
failure to join the Agreement had the potential to severely hamper
the trade economics of a non-member nation.174
The reform-minded politicians in China recognized the power
that GATT held over the international trade market and made a
strong push toward accession.175 Although China had joined
GATT as an original signatory, the country withdrew from the
agreement following the overthrow of the Nationalist government
in 1949.176 The Maoist regime implemented a closed, isolationist
economy, so thirty years would pass before China renewed its
interest in joining the international trade market and participating
in GATT.'77 In conjunction with a series of economic reforms and
a restructuring of the trade regime, China began taking steps to
rejoin GATT in 1980.17
A number of factors led China to pursue participation with
GATT again.17 9 First, GATT was the last of the three major
international organizations in which China did not participate and
joining GATT would help cement China's rising strength as an
international economic power. 180  Second, China could fight
"protectionist and discriminatory tendencies in developed
countries" by taking advantage of GATT's low-tariff and anti-
discrimination requirements, its dispute settlement mechanisms,
and by strengthening its economic influence on the world trade
market.' 8' Joining GATT also would allow China to forge trade
relationships with major trade partners that would provide them
with more detailed information about these countries' trade
173 Id. at 9.
174 See generally id (detailing the sweeping impact that formation of GATT had on
participating countries).
175 JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 9, at 83.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 See id. at 92-93.
180 Id. at 92.
181 Id.
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policies. 82 These strengthened trade relations, in turn, would
allow China's leaders to shape trade policy to improve China's
participation in the world market.'83 Furthermore, membership in
GATT would allow China to take advantage of GATT's dispute
resolution provisions.'84 Prior to accession to GATT, China had to
resolve trade disputes "in the domestic forum of its trading
partners" under "the laws of foreign countries."' 85 The Chinese,
who were reluctant to use foreign forums, saw gaining access to an
international forum as a crucial element of bolstering its growing
trade relations. 18
6
Lastly, GATT's requirement that all participating nations
receive most favored nation (MFN) treatment would force the
United States to grant China permanent MFN status.'87 While
China enjoyed bilateral agreements granting MFN status with
many GATT participants, these agreements often provided China
with "narrower coverage or with exceptions that are otherwise not
permitted under GATT principles."'88  Under the bilateral
agreements, nations often applied "discriminatory quantitative
restrictions and discriminatory safeguard rules" to Chinese
exports.'89  In general, GATT would eliminate these
discriminatory practices to the benefit of Chinese industry. 9 ' The
bilateral MFN agreements that China held with many GATT
nations were also unstable due to the fact that a participating
nation could revoke the agreement at will.' 9'
Another motivating factor behind China's drive to join GATT
was that membership would allow China to reduce U.S. tariffs on
182 Ya Qin, supra note 10, at 7.
183 See id.
184 Id. at 7-8.
185 Id. at 8.
186 See id.
187 Id. In 1980, the United States operated under the Jackson-Vanick amendment to
the 1974 U.S. trade act which required annual approval of China's status as a most
favored nation based on whether or not China violated human rights through restricting
immigration. JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 9, at 92-93.
188 Ya Qin, supra note 10, at 6.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
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Chinese imports by receiving preferred status under the U.S.
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). 192 During China's
efforts to accede to GATT, the United States maintained strict
control over the extension of GSP to communist countries and
limited eligibility to countries that joined the IMF, acceded to
GATT, and received MFN status.193 China was already a member
of IMF, and accession to GATT would allow them to clear the
remaining two hurdles necessary to receive the benefit of U.S.
GSP.19
4
In addition to the many benefits that China would receive
under the existing framework of GATT, accession would allow
China to participate in and have influence on the development and
reform of GATT framework.' 95  Because of an increase in
participation in GATT by the leaders in world trade, GATT gained
increasing influence on the rules of international trade and China,
as a leading nation, had a strong interest in helping to formulate
these rules. 196
Finally, reformers in China saw membership in GATT as a
means of solidifying economic reform due to the many
international agreements that would precede membership in
GATT.1 97 Joining GATT would signal "a commitment to the
world trade order based on market-economy principles," and the
limitations imposed on government participation in the market
would force the government to continue its drive toward a market-
192 JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 9, at 93. "The Generalized System of
Preferences is a program maintained by some twenty industrialized nations designed to
assist designated developing countries by granting preferential tariff rates (more
favorable than MFN rates) to imports of specific products from those countries." Ya
Qin, supra note 10, at 7 n.17.
193 Ya Qin, supra note 10, at 7.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 8.
196 Id.
197 JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 9, at 93. China was
particularly concerned with the MFN treatment granted by the United
States, since the United States is one of the leading trade partners of
China and under the bilateral system the U.S.-China trade agreement
providing MFN status to China's exports is subject to annual renewal
by the President of the United States.
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based economy. "' With these incentives in mind, China
embarked on what would prove to be a lengthy and contentious
journey toward rejoining GATT. 99
Officially, China did not seek to rejoin GATT until 1986.200
Its steps toward membership, however, began in 1980 and 1981,
when China sent officials to participate in policy courses
conducted by GATT and observe GATT meetings as a method of
developing an understanding of GATT.2 °' In 1984, China received
permanent observer status, allowing Chinese officials to attend
GATT meetings and continue the country's push toward joining.2 °2
After developing an understanding of the system and a
relationship with members, China formally notified GATT of its
intention to become a contracting party on July 14, 1986.203 The
wrangling started in earnest in 1987 when China supplied
documents detailing its trade regime and GATT formed a working
party to assess China's readiness to join GATT and to establish a
dialogue on the reforms China would need to make before being
accepted.2 °4 This wrangling would continue for more than fifteen
years.20 5
Although the Western members of GATT had an interest in
bringing China into the membership, they insisted that the
negotiations proceed based on sound economic and commercial
factors rather than on political interests.20 6 Western countries with
market-based economies feared that GATT's emphasis on tariff
reductions would be unable to rid China of the remaining vestiges
198 Ya Qin, supra note 10, at 8.
199 China's Long March to WTO Membership Reaches Destination, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 11, 2001, available at 2001 WL 25083222.
200 Id.
201 JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 9, at 83.
202 Id. at 88.
203 Id. at 92.
204 Id. at 95.
205 See China's Long March to WTO Membership Reaches Destination, supra note
199.
206 JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 9, at 88-89. The emphasis on commercial
considerations arose because Western members felt that when Eastern European
countries without market economies became GATT contracting parties, members with
market-based economies suffered. Id. at 89.
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of a command economy and thus open it to free trade.2"7 These
fears led members of GATT, through the working party, to pepper
China with questions about its trade system.2 °8 China dutifully
answered the multitude of questions and the working party began
to develop a protocol.20 9
Throughout China's effort to join GATT, nations with the
world's strongest economies took the lead in negotiations.210 The
primary source of working group questions came from Japan, the
European Community, and the United States, with developing
countries taking a passive role in the process.211 As negotiations
over terms of accession began, the United States emerged as
China's primary negotiating partner.212 Key points of contention
arose soon after negotiations commenced that would remain
unresolved for more than a decade.2 13 The United States offered
five key demands: a fair and efficient trade policy that applied
equally to all Chinese provinces; transparency in trade regulations
and administration; a tariff system that eliminated separate taxes
and charges at the border; the implementation of a market-based
price system that reflected supply and demand; and safeguard
mechanisms to protect market based industries from unfair
competition.214 On the other side of the table, the Chinese made
four key demands: their joining GATT must be considered a
resumption of membership rather than a new application; tariff
reductions should be the focus of negotiations; China should
receive "developing nation status" under GATT; and China must
receive unconditional MFN status with contracting parties.215
As talks progressed, two facts became clear. One, both China
207 Id. at 89.
208 Id. at 96. GATT members asked China a record 1,200 questions about its trade
system. Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 See id. at 99-102. The European Community (E.C.) also had a prominent role in
the negotiating process, but the E.C. essentially lent support to the demands made by the
United States. Id. at 101.
213 See id. at 102-03.
214 Id. at 99-100.
215 Id. at 100-01.
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and GATT members wanted China admitted to GATT, and, two,
China was far from making the reforms necessary to accomplish
this goal.2 16 By December of 1994, many of these key negotiating
points remained unresolved and GATT denied China's attempt to
gain entry prior to its self-imposed target of January 1, 1995.217
China attributed the failure to interference from the United States
and the European Union.218 GATT members, however, pointed to
China's unwillingness to alter a trade regime that remained
incongruous with basic GATT principles. 219  For example, the
Chinese maintained strong favoritism for domestic commercial
enterprises. 22' Additionally, China's continued insistence on
gaining treatment as a developed nation added to the resistance
from developed nations desiring access to China's markets soon
after its entry into GATT and subsequently, the WTO. 22 1 The
United States, which led the negotiations with China, emphasized
that China's strict treatment of trade imports and failure to
implement a "national treatment" provided the primary barriers to
China's bid.222 Additional barriers included the fact that China
wanted foreign firms to conduct business through a cartel of
Chinese businesses that controlled the market, the failure of China
to achieve transparency by publishing trade regulations, and an
inability or unwillingness to enforce intellectual property
protections.223 Ultimately, the differences between China and
GATT thwarted the attempt to welcome China into GATT.224 As a
216 Reaching an Impasse: China and GATT, ECONOMIST, Aug. 6, 1994, at 52.
217 See China: Saving Face, ECONOMIST, Nov. 19, 1994, at 36. On January 1, 1995,
the WTO formed and integrated the GATT framework into its overarching plan to
regulate international commerce. World Trade: A Troubled Birth, ECONOMIST, Dec. 24,
1994, at 85. Only countries who were members of GATT could become founding
members of the WTO. See China: Saving Face, ECONOMIST, Nov. 19, 1994, at 36.
China, partially motivated by national pride, sought to gain entry to GATT prior to
January 1, 1995, in order to gain entry to the WTO as a founding member. Id.
218 Bushan Bahree, China Fails in Bid to Rejoin GA TT as Talks Hit Impasse, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1994, at 2, available at 1994 WL-WSJA 2738857.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Robert Flint, China Professes No Timetable for WTO Entry, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 1, 1995, at 11, available at 1995 WL-WSJA 10227321.
222 See China: Saving Face, supra note 217, at 36.
223 See id
224 See id.
2003]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
result, GATT parties formed the WTO without the inclusion of "a
fifth of the world's population. ' 2 1
VI. The Creation of the WTO and China's Renewed March to
Accession
As GATT developed from a comprehensive trade agreement
into the leading international trade organization, the contracting
parties recognized the need to formalize GATT's structural
evolution.226 During the Uruguay Round of Negotiations,227 the
contracting parties agreed to a sweeping, multilateral trade
agreement that subsumed GATT and formed the WTO.22 ' The
ambitious goal of the Uruguay Round of Negotiations was to form
multilateral agreements on trade in goods, trade of services,
intellectual property protections, and rules for trade-related
investments. 229  Furthermore, the Uruguay Round sought to
strengthen agreements on "subsidies, dumping, agricultural
supports, rules of origin, and safeguards or escape clause
action., 230  With the formation of the WTO, the former GATT
contracting parties met their ambitious goals and completed the
establishment of a strong, comprehensive international trade
regime.23
The ideals, as stated in the preamble to the Agreement
Establishing the WTO, reflect the desire for the promotion and
protection of free trade through the creation of a multilateral trade
225 See id. (provides quote on the size of China); see also Bahree, supra note 218, at
2.
226 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along With Rights: Institutional Reform in
the New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477,478 (1994).
227 After the formation of GATT in 1947, the contracting parties entered into a
series of multilateral trade negotiations in which participating countries negotiated
thousands of tariff reductions and concessions. See Weaver & Abellard, supra note 134,
at 6. These rounds of negotiations also allowed for the accession of new members. Id.
Five rounds of negotiations took place between GATT's formation in 1947 and the
creation of the WTO in 1994: the first in Geneva, Switzerland shortly after GATT's
formation; the Annecy, France Round in 1949; the Kennedy Round from 1964-1967; the
Tokyo Round from 1973-1979; and the Uruguay Round from 1986-1993.
228 See Lowenfeld, supra note 226, at 478.
229 See id. at 477.
230 See id.
231 See id.
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agreement that led to the formation of GATT.232 The parties noted
that the goal of international trade should be to improve economic
conditions globally, while ensuring the inclusion of developing
nations through trade agreements that reduce tariffs and eliminate
trade discrimination. 3 With these driving principles in mind, the
parties agreed "to develop an integrated more viable and durable
multilateral trading system encompassing the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts,
and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations."34
Less idealistic and more practical motivations, however, also
played a leading role in the formation of the WTO. One of the
driving forces behind strengthening GATT through the formation
of the WTO was the fact that the earlier Agreement allowed
contracting parties to enter into trade arrangements outside the
purview of GATT.235  These extraneous agreements allowed
participants to work around the Agreement and undercut the
"golden rule of GATT - most-favored-nation treatment., 236
Through the Uruguay Round, contracting parties formed GATT
1994 which, under the control of the WTO, required participants
to follow exclusively agreements listed in GATT 1994.237
A second practical motivation in the push to create the WTO
was the inability of GATT 1947 to effectively resolve trade
disputes between parties.238 Under the original GATT, decisions
resolving trade disputes were subject to approval by a vote of all
participants 9.2 3  The result of this provision was that parties who
faced adverse decisions could block the resolution and thwart the
dispute settlement process.24 ° With this flaw in mind, a push for
232 See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994,
Pmbl., 33 I.L.M. 1144, 1144 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]; see also, GATT 1947,
supra note 129, Preamble.
233 WTO Agreement, supra note 232, Pmbl.
234 See Lowenfeld, supra note 226, at 477.
235 Id. at 478.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 478-79.
238 Id. at 479-80.
239 Id.
240 Id.
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the creation of strong institutional structure with the capability of
effectively resolving disputes gained strength and resulted in the
establishment of the WTO.241
The administration of the WTO reflects the parties' desire to
create a more effective organization. Under the WTO agreement,
the structure evolved from the loose, de facto administration of
GATT to a highly structured, fully staffed, and well-funded
administration.242 Unlike GATT, the WTO agreement mandated
that participating members form a Ministerial Conference
composed of all members that meets a minimum of once every
two years to take actions necessary for the WTO to function
properly.243 Between meetings of the Ministerial Conference, the
agreement states that the members must provide representatives to
attend meetings of the General Council.244  Second in the
hierarchy, the General Council has the responsibility for managing
and supervising the WTO's work through frequent meetings.245
To enable the General Council to manage the WTO, the
organization formed a number of councils with the sole function of
monitoring compliance with WTO agreements.246 Included in the
three primary councils is the Council for Trade in Goods, which
focuses on compliance with Annex 1 A of the agreement.247
In addition to the role of managing the operation of the WTO
and monitoring compliance with its various trade agreements, the
General Council serves as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).248
As the DSB for the WTO, the General Council "serves to preserve
rights and obligations under the agreements it covers, and to
clarify those rights and obligations. 2 49 The DSB appoints panels
to carry out a systematic investigation of complaints and to make
241 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 1-
2 (1999) [hereinafter GUIDE].
242 See id. at 6.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 6-7.
247 Id. at 6.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 20.
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specific recommendations on how to resolve disputes.25 0  The
DSB, in turn, adopts these recommendations and gives them effect
unless members of the DSB reach a consensus not to adopt the
recommendation.251 With this system in place, the WTO replaced
the inadequate dispute resolution system under GATT and adopted
a system that provided more effective dispute resolution
procedures. 252
A third function that the General Council performs is serving
as the Trade Policy Review Board (TPRB). 253  The TPRB
regularly reviews and evaluates the trade policies of members of
the WTO to examine compliance with trade agreements. 254 The
review also gives the member a voice to explain to the WTO "how
its trade policies relate to its broader economic growth and
development, and also to emphasize difficulties that may be
created for it by the policies of its trading partners., 255  The
reviews conducted by the TPRB build a stronger organization by
providing the WTO with the opportunity to examine all aspects of
a member's trade policy, by providing members with independent
input on their national trade policy, and by helping governments to
highlight needed trade policy reforms.256
The creation of the WTO affirmed the dominance of free trade
in the international economy and represented "the triumph of free-
market economies.,, 257 The inclusion of nations which had long
practiced protectionist trade policies signaled the sweeping
dominance of the new trade regime.5 With this triumph, nations
on the outside, even those traditionally averse to free trade
practices, clamored to gain acceptance.259 China was among those
250 Id. at 21.
251 Id. at 23.
252 See id.
253 Id. at 31.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 32.
256 Id. at 34.
257 Helene Cooper & John Harwood, The Vote on GATT, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1994,
at Al.
258 Id.
259 Id.
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on the outside hoping to get in.
Although China failed to gain acceptance from GATT and
missed its opportunity to join the WTO as a charter member, it
enjoyed tremendous success with international trade.261 In the
twenty years following the opening of its economy, China
experienced 15% annual growth in exports and an average of 13%
growth in imports.262 This success led to a lingering skepticism
among some Chinese officials about the importance of accession
to the WTO and the rationale behind making the necessary
reforms.2 63 Some hesitated to pursue membership for fear that the
necessary trade reforms would severely cripple domestic
industries.264 Ultimately, those advocating a renewed pursuit of
WTO accession won out and China gradually began implementing
reforms in an attempt to squeeze itself into the WTO rubric.265
Initial reforms included reductions in tariffs and an elimination of
quotas.266 Additional reforms were based around the opening of
the Chinese market for imported movies, music and software.267
The WTO members stood ready to resume negotiations with
China and had a number of demands to put on the table.268 One of
the primary demands remained an insistence that China liberalize
its economy prior to entry into the WTO and that China shelve its
interest in joining as a "developing nation. ' '269 If granted entry as a
"developing nation," China would be able "to gain better
opportunities to export while making fewer concessions than an
industrialized country, such as cuts in import duties and equal
260 Id.
261 See The Real Leap Forward, supra note 51, at 25.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 See Flint, supra note 221, at 11.
265 See Joseph Kahn, China Pledges Reform, Seeking to Enter WTO, ASIAN WALL
ST. J., Nov. 20, 1995, at 1, available at 1995 WL-WSJA 10228789.
266 Id.
267 Marcus W. Brauchli & Craig S. Smith, Trade Route: China Is Poised to Join the
WTO, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 1995, at 1, available at 1995 WL-WSJA 2135616.
268 Id.
269 Talks on China Entering WTO Are to Resume, ASIAN WALL ST. J., May 18,
1995, at 2, available at 1995 WL-WSJA 8773602.
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treatment of foreign companies., 27' The United States and the
European Union remained convinced that China could meet these
demands and insisted that liberalization occur prior to China's
WTO accession.2 United States businessmen found China's
failure to equalize trading rights and continued involvement in
actively running sectors of the economy to be inconsistent with
WTO policies and insisted changes in these areas would have to
be made before China could be ready to accede. 272  "National
treatment" remained at the forefront of the debate.273 Clearly, a
cluttered path remained between China and the WTO.
The outside pressure to make extensive reforms prior to
joining the WTO and the internal drive to accomplish that goal,
led China through a maze of complex negotiations and internal
economic reform. Application to the WTO takes a country
thuough a four-step process. 27 First, the applicant must provide
the WTO with a memorandum detailing its trade system in order
for a WTO working party to assess the applicant country's level of
compliance with WTO agreements.275 Second, the applicant must
conduct individual negotiations with members of the WTO to
hammer out specific agreements on tariffs and other trade
concerns. 276  Once the applicant has completed bilateral
negotiations, the working party conducts the third step toward
accession by drafting a "protocol of accession" that contains
specific terms of accession and the mandates that the applicant
must follow once admitted.277 Finally, the WTO General Council
or Ministerial Conference reviews the applicant's information and
270 Id.
271 See id.
272 Eduardo Lachica, West Makes It Clear: China's WTO Effort Lacking, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1995, at 8, available at 1995 WL-WSJA 10226813.
273 Eduardo Lachica, China Meanders Along Road to WTO, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 1, 1995, at 1, available at 1995 WL-WSJA 10229909.
274 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADING INTO THE FuTURE 64 (2d ed. 2001)
[hereinafter Trading Into the Future]. "[Any trade or customs union] having full
autonomy over the conduct of its trade policies may... join the WTO" with the approval
of member nations. Id.
275 Id. All members of the WTO may participate on working parties. Id.
276 Id.
277 Id.
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agreements and puts accession to a vote. 278 A two-thirds majority
of participating countries is sufficient for approval.279  This
laborious process took China nearly six years to complete.28°
Following the working party's review of the memorandum,
China entered into bilateral negotiations with other members of
the WTO. 281  The negotiations with the United States were
paramount, and the trade agreement that formed from these
negotiations marked China's clearance of a major hurdle blocking
the road to accession. 282 Finally, after thirteen years of contentious
negotiations, the United States and China completed a trade
agreement and the door for China's entry to the WTO was
opened.283
With a trade agreement in place, Congressional approval of
Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) remained the last step
for the United States endorsement of Chinese accession to the
WTO. 284  As the debate over China's admission to the WTO
moved to the United States Congress, both liberal and
278 Id. The Ministerial Conference is a biannual meeting of representatives, or
"ministers," of each WTO member state. Id. The General Council, which reports to the
Ministerial Conference, is composed of all the members of the WTO and conducts the
day-to-day business of the organization. Id. at 60.
279 Id. at 64.
280 See China 's Long March to WTO Membership Reaches Destination, supra note
199. China began formal talks with the WTO in May of 1995 and received approval on
November 10, 2001. Id.
281 Id.
282 See The Real Leap Forward, supra note 51, at 25.
283 See JOHN WONG, StNo-U.S. TRADE ACCORD AND CHINA'S ACCESSION TO THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 3 (2000).
284 Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S., China
Sign Historic Trade Agreement (Nov. 15, 1999) (on file with author). The 1947 GATT,
which was incorporated in the 1994 GATT, provides that all member nations must
receive "unconditional" MFN status. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Jan. 1,
1948, art. 1, T.1.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. In the United States, the "Jackson-Vanik
amendment," incorporated in the Trade Act of 1974 as a means of promoting free
emigration, limits the President to providing MFN trading status to non-market
economies in one-year increments. In effect, the President must provide an annual
waiver to China and is precluded from granting permanent status as a "most favored
nation." See MARK A. GROOMBRIDGE, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TO A MARKET ECONOMY,
12-13 (CATO Inst., Trade Policy Analysis No. 10, Apr. 24, 2000), available at
http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-010es.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2003) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
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conservative politicians raised voices of opposition to approving
PNTR.285 Politicians and special-interest groups concerned about
China's record on protection of the environment and human rights
joined with protectionist labor unions to oppose granting China
MFN status.286 Ultimately, those in favor of granting China PNTR
prevailed in the debate as the House of Representatives voted 237-
197 in favor of authorizing legislation. The less-divisive Senate
approved the bill 83-15.287 Hailing the legislation as an important
step toward building a safe, integrated world, President Clinton
signed the agreement into law on October 10, 2000, concluding a
crucial step for China's entry into the WTO.28 8
While finalizing terms of accession with the United States was
a significant step, China still faced the task of completing
accession agreements with twenty-four WTO members including
the European Union, Canada, Brazil, and India.289 Commentators
saw the accession agreement with the United States as a catalyst
for China to reach agreements with the remaining members.290
The additional negotiations, however, took over a year, and China
did not reach a bilateral agreement with the European Union until
October of 2000.291 With the final bilateral agreements in place,
China and the WTO shifted their focus to multilateral negotiations
and finalizing China's terms of accession.292
The third step of accession is a multilateral negotiation in
which the WTO working party works with the acceding nation to
draft the final terms of accession."' These terms include the
commitments that will be binding upon the applicant once
accession to the WTO is complete.294 China and the WTO
285 See The Remaining Hurdles, ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1999, at 26.
286 Id.
287 Liu Jiang & Hu Xiaoming, President Clinton Signs Bill Granting China PNTR
Status, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Oct. 11, 2000, available at 2000 WL 27928250.
288 A 'Great Day'for the U.S., SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 11, 2000, at C1.
289 See The Remaining Hurdles, supra note 285, at 26.
290 Id.
291 Bilateral EU Obstacles to China's Entry into WTO Resolved, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Oct. 27, 2000, available at 2000 WL 24745873.
292 See id.
293 TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supra note 274, at 64.
294 Id.
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completed the terms of accession on November 10, 2001, and
bound China to the multilateral agreements that have guided
international free trade since the founding of GATT.295  The
protocol included many provisions that would impact the ability of
foreign enterprises to operate in China.296 Among the key
provisions were several that impacted China's administration of its
trade regime. 297  The protocol required uniformity of law
throughout the many provinces of China and required that the
Chinese "apply and administer in a uniform, impartial and
reasonable manner all its laws, regulations and other measures" of
both the national and local governments which must conform to its
WTO obligations. 298 Furthermore, the protocol required China to
establish a system in which parties could complain to the central
government about "non-uniform application of the trade
regime., 299 The protocol also required the Chinese administration
to achieve transparency in its trade laws by making available to
WTO members, through an official publication, all laws and
regulations affecting trade.3"' To give the transparency
requirement teeth, the protocol allowed China to enforce only laws
that are available to interested parties.30 ' The protocol's
requirement of providing judicial review of the administration of
Chinese trade laws composed a third significant reform.30 2 The
terms of the agreement required China to establish an impartial
tribunal to review administrative decisions.30 3
A non-discrimination provision included in the protocol
brought one of the guiding forces behind the establishment of
GATT to the Chinese trade regime.30 4 The provision required
China to give foreign economic ventures in China the same
295 World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic
of China WT/L/432 (Nov. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Protocol].
296 See id. para. 1.
297 See id.
298 Id. para. 2.
299 Id. para. 1.
300 Id.
301 Id. para. 1.
302 Id. para. 2.
303 Id.
304 See id. para. 3.
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treatment that it provided Chinese ventures with respect to the
purchase of goods and services necessary for production, the
availability of domestic markets, and the availability of goods
provided by the government at equal prices.3 5 As a corollary to
non-discrimination, the protocol required the Chinese to end state
control of trade and to progressively increase the ability of all
enterprises to trade throughout China.3 6 The ultimate goal of this
provision was for China to provide foreign enterprises with a right
to trade on equal terms with Chinese enterprise.30 7 Furthermore,
the protocol mandated that China put its state trading enterprises
on equal footing with private enterprise with regard to trade by
prohibiting these enterprises from directing the "quantity, value, or
country of origin of goods purchased or sold. 30 8 The agreement
required China to nationalize its import and export licensing
procedures and to provide these licenses to domestic and foreign
enterprises in a non-discriminatory manner.30 9
Additionally, the protocol on accession specified restrictions
on China's ability to interfere with and manipulate the trade
market.310 With certain exceptions, the protocol prohibited China
from subjecting goods to price controls and demanded that China
"allow prices for traded goods ... to be determined by market
forces." '311 The agreement required the government to report
certain subsidies listed in its Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures and to eliminate others.312
Taxes imposed on imports were required to conform with the
strictures of GATT 1994 and taxes on exports, with limited
exceptions, were eliminated altogether.313
Other provisions sought to limit the impact of China's
accession on the economies of its trade competitors.3 14 The anti-
305 Id.
306 Id. para. 5.
307 Id.
308 Id. para. 6.
309 Id. para. 8.
310 See id. para. 9.
311 Id.
312 Id. para. 10.
313 Id. para. 11.
314 See id. para. 15-16.
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dumping provisions of GATT now applied to China and
established standards and procedures to be used in evaluating
complaints about Chinese dumping.315 Fears that a flood of
Chinese goods into the economy of another WTO member could
significantly disrupt a competitor's domestic market led to the
inclusion of a number of provisions intended to limit these
disruptions.316
With the terms of accession in place, China reached the final
step in its bid to join the WTO - the vote. Prior to voting, the
WTO General Council reviews the working party's report and
protocol along with the applicant's terms of accession prior to
voting on approval.3"7 A two-thirds majority vote is required to
approve accession.318 Finally, in December of 2001, the WTO
Ministerial Conference approved China's accession to the WTO
and completed a fifteen-year series of difficult, controversial
negotiations." 9
VII. China Accedes... So What?
Accession to the WTO is a significant milestone in China's
progression from the closed, controlled economy first visited by
President Richard Nixon in 1972, to a market-based system that
embraces world trade.320 With accession, China shifts from
directing its economy by its own rules to conforming its economic
operation to international standards.321  This economic
transformation has sparked a significant increase in China's
participation in the world market that will impact industries
worldwide.3 22
Prior to accession, the Chinese economy made significant
strides toward a market-based economy but maintained vestiges of
315 Id. para. 15.
316 See id. para. 16.
317 TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supra note 274, at 64.
318 Id.
319 See Peter Wonacott, China Begins Career as WTO Member, WALL ST. J., Dec.
11, 2001, at A14.
320 See Erick Eckholm & David Sanger, The Trade Deal: The Overview, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 1999, at Al.
321 ld.
322 See id.
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the state-controlled economy implemented under Mao.323 At the
close of the twentieth century, state interference and control of
markets and production complemented the "explosive growth of a
market-oriented commercial sector" and prevented Chinese
reformers from completing the dismantling of the state-run
economy.324 Commentators saw accession to the WTO as a means
of neutralizing opposition to China's economic reformers and
binding the country to a market-based economy through "pro-
market international obligations. 325  Pro -reform Chinese
politicians relied on accession to the WTO to serve as a lever
toward opening China's economy, using mandated reforms in
areas where internal Chinese reforms had failed.326
The result of WTO accession is that China solidified its
movement toward a market-based economy through key structural
reforms and a commitment to the rule of law.327 The reforms that
China made in preparation to accede to the WTO resulted in a
reduction in traditionally high tariffs, the implementation of an
even and more fairly administered tax system, the reduction of
non-tariff barriers to trade, the gradual phase out of quotas,
liberalized government control of trade, and the abandonment of
export subsidies.328  These many reforms have led to a
"transformation of a semi-closed economic system into one going
global on the back of foreign investment and corporate
privatization." 3
29
The transformation of the Chinese economy that resulted from
its desire to accede to the WTO has dramatically increased China's
role in the global economy. 3 ' The concessions made by China led
to predictions that there would be tremendous growth in foreign
323 GROOMBRIDGE, supra note 284, at 2.
324 See id.
325 Id. at 5.
326 See Ian Johnson, WTO Deal Promises to Spur China's Reform, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 16, 1999, at A21.
327 TRADE COMPLIANCE CENTER, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE: CHINA (2002),
available at http://www.tcc.mac.doc.gov/cgi-bin/doit.cgi?218:54:1:5 (last visited on
August 30, 2003).
328 Id.
329 Wonacott, supra note 319, at A14.
330 See generally, JOHN WONG, et al., SINO-U.S. TRADE ACCORD AND CHINA'S
ACCESSION TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2000).
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investment.331 In turn, the increase in foreign investment was
supposed to lead to reform of Chinese industry and a boost in the
manufacturing of small, labor-intensive goods.332 In its increased
manufacturing sector, Chinese industry has developed multi-stage
production arrangements with other Asian nations in which China
concentrates its efforts on the labor-intensive stages of
production.333 The result of these arrangements is that production
has moved from high-wage countries like Japan, Taiwan, and
Korea to the labor-abundant manufacturing centers of China.334
The growth resulting from this economic liberalization will boost
the proportion of global exports flowing from China.335 One
prediction estimates that by 2005, accession to the WTO will lead
to a doubling of foreign investment going into China and a
doubling of exports coming from China.336
By 2003, China had become the leading net recipient of
foreign investment and began to dominate manufacturing in
industries ranging from toys to shoes to air conditioners.337 While
commentators urge that the explosive growth in the Chinese
economy does not signal pending destruction of competing
economies, it is clear that China dominates labor-intensive
industries.338 In fact, "seventy percent of China's exports today
are of garments, toys, shoes, furniture, and such like., 39
Following the basic economic law of comparative advantage will
continue to lead China to focus on exporting light manufacturing
products like furniture and importing high-cost goods.340
The economic reforms made in preparation to accede to the
331 Id. at8.
332 See id.
333 U.S. INT'L. TRADE COMM'N, ASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON THE
UNITED STATES OF CHINA'S ACCESSION TO THE WTO (Sept. 1999).
334 See id.
335 Id.
336 The Real Leap Forward, supra note 51, at 25.
337 See Eating Your Lunch? ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 2003, at 12.
338 Is the Wakening Giant a Monster? ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 2003, at 63. China
gains the advantage in labor-intensive industries thanks to a "seemingly infinite supply
of workers" willing to work an average wage of sixty cents per hour. Id.
339 ld
340 See Anderson, supra note 50, at A7.
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WTO poised Chinese industry to have a significant impact on
specific sectors of U.S. industry.3 41 In assessing the impact that
accession to the WTO would have on China, the United States
Industrial Trade Commission (USITC) predicted that the removal
of non-tariff barriers would bring a significant increase in foreign
investment to China. 42 Specifically, the USITC predicted that the
implementation of national treatment, transparency, and judicial
review in trade regulation would have an impact on all sectors of
the economy due to increases in foreign investment. 3  The
reduction in tariffs that would result from China's accession to the
WTO was also predicted to impact the U.S. economy.3 44 While not
expected to impact U.S. Gross Domestic Product, the reduction in
tariffs was expected to have a significant impact on trade flows
between the United States and China with U.S. exports to China
increasing by 10% and Chinese exports to the United States
increasing by 7%.345 Multinational corporations and U.S.
industries with a strong comparative advantage with China stood
to gain from these changes, but, at the same time, labor-intensive
industries in the United States braced for a rising wave of imports
from China.4 6 The U.S. wood products industry stood among the
industries expected to be negatively affected by China's entry into
the global economy.3 47 The combination of a more advantageous
market for foreign investment and manufacturing labor-intensive
goods for export set the stage for a massive migration of the home
furnishings industry from its roots in North Carolina to the
newborn factories in China.348
VIII. The Furniture Industry Embraces China
In 2001 North Carolina furniture manufacturers laid off 5,000
employees.3 49  Furniture shipments decreased 10.3% from the
341 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 333.
342 Id. at x.
343 Id. at xii.
344 Id. at xix.
345 Id. at xx.
346 WONG, et al., supra note 330, at 8.
347 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 333, at xx.
348 Manufacturers Get Hit Hard on the Home Front, supra note 2, at 38.
349 Id.
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previous year.35° These economic indicators led an executive from
the American Furniture Manufacturers Association to call 2001
the worst year in the past thirty years of home furnishings
manufacturing.351 The tremendous rise in imports from China has
played a significant role in the decline in furniture
manufacturing.352 During the 1990s, furniture imports grew from
$3.4 billion to $12.2 billion.353 A second large jump occurred
between 1999 and 2002, as imports increased 71% and accounted
for 40% of the domestic furniture market.35 4  Despite high
consumer spending in the face of an economic slow down, the
influx of inexpensive, but high quality imports has taken its toll on
the furniture industry and has led to widespread plant closings and
layoffs. 3
55
These dramatic changes in the industry resulted from the
severe rise in furniture imports from China, where laborers earning
$100 per month while living in dorms have led to the development
of "one of the country's fastest-growing industries.,, 3" As one of
the top ten importers of furniture, China resides at the top with
2000 U.S. imports accounting for $3.7 billion in furniture sales.357
An abundance of cheap labor, an increase in foreign investment,
assistance in setting up plants, and partnerships with foreign
companies have enabled China to lead the way.358 Even in 2001,
when China's competitors experienced a decrease in exports to the
United States, Chinese furniture manufacturers experienced an
11% rise in exports.359 With the increase in opportunities, young,
privately held companies that often operate as joint ventures with
350 Id.
351 Id.
352 Id.
353 Exsten, supra note 40, at 1 E.
354 Hilsenrath & Wonacott, supra note 47, at A2.
355 Id.
356 See id.
357 ANDERSON, BAUMAN, TOURTELLOT, VOS, & Co., FURNITURE MANUFACTURING
IN THE 2 1 sT CENTURY (Sept. 2001), at http://www.abtv.com/watch.htm.
358 Rich Christianson, No Stopping China's Momentum, WOOD & WOOD PRODUCTS,
Mar. 2002, at 9.
359 Id.
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U.S. firms are entering the market.36 ° In 1999, 100 Chinese
companies demonstrated the emerging strength of the Chinese
furniture industry by sending representatives to attend the
venerated furniture market in High Point. 6'
As the representatives of Chinese furniture companies toured
the High Point furniture market for the first time, companies that
have participated in the market for decades scrambled to adapt to
the increased competition from overseas.3 62  Every sector of the
industry faced the choice of either adapting to the changing market
or struggling to remain viable.3 63 The modernized, high-tech plants
in China provided competition for both high-end and low-end
furniture, and for both small plants and large manufacturers.364
Noting the reality that the globalization trend is unlikely to reverse
anytime soon, industry observers have recognized the inevitable
shift of furniture manufacturing to China and have laid the
challenge of adapting to this economic, reality at the feet of
domestic manufacturers.3 65  To survive in the changed market,
furniture manufacturers implemented a variety of strategies.366
While exporting to new markets overseas provided manufacturers
with some room for growth, the primary plans implemented were
closing domestic plants and importing inexpensive products from
overseas, entering into joint ventures with overseas competitors, or
creating strategic alliances with competitors. In the alternative,
those companies choosing to ignore the increased competition
from overseas "will eventually have to lay off workers and
ultimately close plants or see their profits turn into a river of red
ink.,
3 6 8
360 See George McMillan III & Pat McMillan, China Emerges as Major Furniture
Player, WOOD & WOOD PRODUCTS, Jan. 1999, available at 1999 WL 13862851.
361 Id.
362 See Tom Dossenbach, Globalization Strategies for 2002, Part 1, WOOD & WOOD
PRODUCTS, Feb. 2002, at 35.
363 See id.
364 See id.
365 See Tom Dossenbach, Globalization is Here! What Can We Do?, WOOD &
WOOD PRODUCTS, Aug. 2001, at 29.
366 See Tom Dossenbach, Globalization Strategies - Part 2, Your Options, WOOD &
WOOD PRODUCTS, Mar. 2002, at 29.
367 Id.
368 Dossenbach, supra note 365, at 29.
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Ethan Allen, one of the nation's largest furniture makers
demonstrates this trend.3 69 As it rose to prominence in the U.S.
home furnishings market, Ethan Allen took pride in the vertical
integration that utilized eighteen plants and three sawmills to
supply a large network of retail stores.37° As China became a
major participant in the U.S. furniture industry, however, Ethan
Allen adjusted its corporate philosophy to adapt to the changing
times and remain competitive.37' In 2000, Ethan Allen still
produced 83% of its furniture, but a strategic alliance formed with
leading Chinese furniture manufacturer, Markor, is indicative of
the company's drive to move manufacturing overseas, 37 2 which
has led to the closing of Ethan Allen plants in the United States.373
In fact, within a week of the creation of the strategic alliance with
Markor, Ethan Allen announced the closing of three factories.374
As U.S. factories shuttered their windows and their locked
doors forever, budding Chinese furniture manufacturing plants
blossomed.375 Markor Furniture International is barely a decade
old, but it is now one of the most influential companies in the
international furniture industry.37 6 As one commentator notes,
"Markor is a modern and aggressive firm that has taken full
advantage of China's reforms and resulting juggernaut
economy., 377  After starting as a small furniture maker with a
single 24,000 square-foot factory in a remote Chinese town in
1993, Markor has developed eight plants totaling 600,000 square
feet.37 8 In 2001, Markor sold $120 million in furniture, and
experts expect continued growth in coming years. 37 9  Through
partnerships and alliances with almost thirty U.S. manufacturers,
369 See Voyles, supra note 19, at 47.
370 Id.
371 See id.
372 Id.
373 Id.
374 Id.
375 See, e.g., Harry Urban, U.S. Furniture Makers Heed the Great Call of China,
WOOD & WOOD PRODUCTS, Apr. 2000, at 64.
376 Id.
377 Id.
378 Id.
379 See id.
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Markor's reach is deep into the U.S. furniture market. ° LifeStyle
Furnishings, Inc., a multibillion dollar manufacturer based in High
Point, N.C. furthered the furniture industry's move to China when,
in 2001, it sold its Universal Furniture division to Canton, China
company, Lacquer Craft Manufacturing Company, Ltd.3"'
Universal's President noted that furniture executives see
manufacturing in China, combined with U.S. marketing, as the
future of the furniture industry.382
IX. Conclusion
The reforms made by China along its path to accession to the
WTO helped to solidify market-based economic principles and
create the fastest growing industrial production in the world.383
The impact of China's emergence as the "workshop of the world"
on U.S. manufacturing is illustrated through the influence that this
emergence has had on the North Carolina furniture industry. Prior
to economic reform, China was little more than an afterthought in
the minds of North Carolina furniture executives.384 By gradually
reforming its trade laws during its drive to accede to the WTO,
China grew to become an appealing country for labor-intensive
industries. The low-wage employees and high quality production,
coupled with a stabilizing government administration of trade law,
created an irresistible location for furniture manufacturing.
The result is that the North Carolina furniture industry has
witnessed a sharp rise in imports flowing from China.385 In turn,
these companies are casting their eyes across the Pacific in search
of a competitive advantage. On December 28, 2001, Furniture
Brands International purchased Drexel Heritage, the company that
grew from making corn cribs in rural Drexel, North Carolina, to
380 See id.
381 See West Meets East: LifeStyle Furnishings Readies Sale of Universal to Chinese
Firm, WOOD & WOOD PRODUCTS, July 2001, available at http://www.iswonline.
com/index-wwp.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
382 See id.
383 See U. S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 333.
384 See Cole Interview, supra note 8.
385 See U.S. INT'L. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 4.
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become one of the leading home furnishing manufacturers.386
Furniture Brands International, the largest manufacturer of
residential furniture in the United States, closed its Thomasville,
North Carolina plant in 2002 and "shuttered four factories in
Virginia. 3 87 Now, most of the furniture formerly made in North
Carolina arrives by freighter from the shores of Asia.388 Furniture
Brands International, however, continues to produce furniture
under the Drexel Heritage name in the towns of Drexel and
Morganton. 38 9 For now, that is.
DANIEL JOHNSON
386 Furniture Brands Int., SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, 10-K, Mar. 25, 2002.
387 Hilsenrath & Wonacott, supra note 47, at A2.
388 See id.
389 See Furniture Brands Int., supra note 386.
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